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Abstract
The evaluation of interventions has become a commonly used policy
tool, which is frequently adopted to improve the transparency and e®ec-
tiveness of public policy. However, evaluation methods based on com-
paring treatment and control groups in small scale trials are not capable
of providing a complete picture of the likely e®ects of a policy and do
not provide a framework which allows issues relating to the design of the
programme to be addressed. The longer term e®ects relate to decisions
by individuals to change aspects of their life-cycle behavior not directly
targeted by the intervention, so as to best take into account of its pres-
ence. They also relate to possible changes in prices that may change or
even reverse the incentives designed by the programme. In this paper we
show how experimental data from ¯eld trials can be used to enhance the
evaluation of interventions and we also illustrate the potential importance
of allowing for longer term incentive and General Equilibrium e®ects.
1 Introduction
The evaluation of interventions has become a commonly used policy tool. This
has led to a better understanding of the overall bene¯ts and costs of interven-
tions, and of their distributional impact. It has also improved transparency in
policy making and lead to choices that are founded in fact rather than political
prejudice. Recent examples of policy-in°uential evaluations are the Job Training
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1Partnership act in the USA (see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997)) or the
evaluation of the Education Maintenance allowance in the UK - a conditional
cash transfer, incentivising 16 year old children to stay on at school in the UK
(see Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir (2005)), the PROGRESA pro-
gramme in Mexico, discussed below and many others. A large body of research
has further stimulated its use and has addressed important intellectual chal-
lenges1. The standard basis for evaluations has been ¯eld trials where a policy is
implemented in a small scale and its e®ects measured by comparing to a suitably
chosen comparison group. The gold standard in this approach is a randomized
trial where the unit of randomization may by an individual or a community,
however de¯ned. Other than that, a large number of alternative methods have
been developed, or adapted from standard econometric techniques, based on
observational data. These include matching and quasi-experimental methods
such as Instrumental Variables and Di®erence in Di®erences2. However there
are many reasons why this set of approaches can only o®er limited answers to
the question of policy design and need to be complemented with further meth-
ods of analysis. First, long term implementation of a programme may induce
changes in behavior by individuals that cannot be measured by a simple com-
parison of the treated and control group in the short run. Thus a programme
that subsidizes wages may indeed increase employment of the client group rel-
ative to a comparison grouping in some isolated labor market; however it may
also change the incentives to invest in human capital (see Heckman, Lochner,
and Cossa (2003) and Adda, Dustmann, Meghir, and Robin (2005)) an e®ect
1Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), LaLonde (1986), Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, (1997,
1998), Heckman and Robb (1985), Imbens and Angrist (1994) to name but a few.
2E®ectively an instrumental variables method in itself.
2that will occur a few years down the road. Second, the programme may have
more wide-ranging impacts a®ecting individuals who are not explicitly targeted
by the policy, including changing behavior to become a member of the targeted
group and thus obtain the bene¯ts of the programme. In certain cases, ¯eld tri-
als can be designed to measure such e®ects, as distinct from the main e®ects of
the programme; this is however di±cult in practice and requires a large amount
of resources to be expended. Thirdly, while a small ¯eld trial may not a®ect
prices because the changes in supply and demand of say human capital that it
induces are negligible, the same cannot be said of a broad implementation of a
successful programme (see Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a)). In this case
the e®ects of the programme can be seriously mitigated to the extent that they
are almost neutralized.
There are two main themes that we address in this paper. First, we discuss
the use of randomized ¯eld experiments to estimate structural economic models
that can then be used to improve on the design of interventions. We argue that
this approach reinforces the usefulness of experiments in that it allows, given
the model assumptions, to go beyond the simple conclusions that can be drawn
by a comparison of means. Moreover, economic models can be used to guide
the way we design experiments in the ¯rst place, so as to get most out of them
and be able to identify important aspects of behavior. In this sense we pursue
the ideal set forth byOrcutt and Orcutt (1968) where experiments on incentives
are advocates are used to learn about structural parameters in an economic
model. Thus, our ¯rst example draws from the paper by Attanasio, Meghir,
and Santiago (2005) where data from a ¯eld trial in Mexico (PROGRESA) was
combined with a structural model of education choice to produce a model that at
3the same time challenges the results obtained by conventional observational data
and provides a framework for thinking of better ways to redesign the programme
or compare with alternative policies.
The next theme of the paper addresses longer term evaluation questions that
cannot be dealt with based on ¯eld experiments. Two issues arise requiring
structural economic models. First, interventions may have longer run incentive
e®ects along dimensions not intended. For example a programme designed to
boost employment by wage subsidies may reduce human capital accumulation.
This issue has been addressed empirically by Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa
(2003), Blundell, Costa-Dias, and Meghir (2003) and more recently by Adda,
Dustmann, Meghir, and Robin (2005). These papers consider di®erent forms of
wage subsidy interventions and show that these can a®ect substantially Human
Capital accumulation. Second, as discussed in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith
(1999) and illustrated empirically in Heckman, Lochner, and Taber, (1998b),
large scale interventions may have important consequences for prices and hence
for outcomes, at least in some settings where factor price equalization inter-
nationally is somehow prevented. In this case these General Equilibrium (GE)
e®ects can be very large and often neutralize or sometimes reinforce the e®ects of
policy.3 More recently the notion of using empirical GE models to evaluate pol-
icy interventions and to understand trends in the labor market is becoming more
prevalent. Examples of such work include Alonso-Borrego, Fernndez-Villaverde,
and Galdon-Sanchez (2004) who look at the impact of short term employment
contracts and ¯nd that they decrease employment and Lee and Wolpin (2005)
who use a GE model to understand the evolution of wages and employment in
3For an example of the latter see Gallipoli and Fella (2005).
4the services sector.
Here we examine the potential importance of dynamic incentive and Gen-
eral Equilibrium e®ects by summarizing the results of two papers. The ¯rst is
the paper by Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2005) and the second by Blundell,
Costa-Dias, and Meghir (2003). In these models risk-averse life-cycle consumers
choose education, labor supply and consumption in a world with uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk. The economy is stationary and consists of overlapping gener-
ations. Output is produced by a production function which is constant returns
to scale in capital and three types of labor characterized by the level of formal
education { less than high school, high school and some College. The models are
capable of addressing the issues of dynamic incentives and endogenous prices.
They thus allow for interactions between individuals due to a number of mech-
anisms: The government budget constraint, used to fund the intervention, the
dynamic incentives created by the programme and the endogeneity of prices.4
Using these models we consider the impact of tuition subsidies and of temporary
wage subsidies, similar to those o®ered by the UK New Deal - an active labor
market programme introduced in 1998.
2 School subsidies and Education choices in Mex-
ico
Our ¯rst example is based on the paper by Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago
(2005) and illustrates the use of experimental data for ¯tting an economic model,
with which it is then possible to address questions of design in a partial equi-
4There is a real issue here relating to the possibility of factor price equalization. This is a
controversial topic we have not addressed. In our illustrations we take prices as endogenous.
However, even if prices were exogenous the other issues relating to dynamic incentives over
the life-cycle would remain.
5librium framework.
2.1 The PROGRESA program and the evaluation data.
In 1997, the Mexican government started a large program to reduce poverty in
rural Mexico, by focussing on increasing education using subsidies (\conditional
cash transfers") and improving health and nutrition. The programme is known
as PROGRESA5 was ¯rst implemented in a randomly chosen set of village
communities out of a population of eligible ones; for the purposes of evaluation.
Data was collected both from the communities that were randomized into the
programme and those randomized out. The programme was implemented in all
communities with a delay of 1.5 years. Greater details of the programme can
be found in Schultz (2003) and Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005).
Once a locality quali¯es for the programme, individual households within it
could qualify or not, depending on a single indicator of poverty. The largest
component of the program is the education one. Bene¯ciary households with
school age children receive grants conditional on school attendance. The size
of the grant increases with the grade and, for secondary education, is slightly
higher for girls than for boys. In Table 1, we report the grant structure as it
was at the start of the programme. All the ¯gures are in current pesos, and can
be converted in US dollars at approximately an exchange rate of 10 pesos per
dollar. To keep the grant, children have to attend at least 85% of classes. Upon
not passing a grade, a child is still entitled to the grant for the same grade.
However, if the child fails the grade again, it looses eligibility.6 In addition to
the bimonthly payments, bene¯ciaries with children in school age receive a small
5The Spanish acronym for 'Health, Nutrition and Education'
6All the ¯gures are in current pesos, and can be converted in US dollars at approximately
an exchange rate of 10 pesos per dollar.
6PROGRESA bimonthly monetary bene¯ts


















Table 1: Table Caption
annual grant for school supplies.
The randomized trial, o®ers the opportunity to obtain unbiased estimates of
the average impact of the programme on any desired outcome non-parametrically,
simply by comparing the estimated mean outcomes between treatment and con-
trol villages. There results can also be broken down by characteristics that are
exogenous or determined pre-programme. However, there are a number of in-
tricate aspects to the design of the programme or deeper questions that cannot
be answered directly by the randomized trial. For example, the policymakers
in increasing the grant by grade are responding to the fact that the school drop
out rates increase quite dramatically during the teenage years. But whether
the best use of funds has been made in this direction cannot be addressed by
the randomized trial. While it would be possible and scienti¯cally desirable to
design a ¯eld trial with many directions of variation by age this is not practical.
7To proceed further an economic model can be ¯tted to the observed responses
by combining the exogenous source of variation induced by the experiment by
other sources of variation that can be considered conditionally exogenous. This
combines the experiment with reasonable assumptions to further enhance our
understanding and the scope of the data. Within this context it will also be pos-
sible to test whether the experimental data would lead to the same conclusions
as those obtained by a model estimated solely on observational data.
The analysis is based on the evaluation data whose collection began in 1997
and following the start of the in 1998. This is a household based panel, which
collects information on schooling, work patterns, earnings and income as well
as on consumption and household assets.
Table 2 provides the di®erence in di®erences estimates of the e®ects of the
policy for the eligible individuals drawn from Attanasio, Meghir, and Santi-
ago (2005). These are obtained by comparing the growth of school attendance
between baseline and after the programme started in treatment and control
villages. While a simple post-programme comparison between treatment and
control would have provided unbiased estimate, in this context the di®erence in
di®erences improves precision. The key conclusion from this table, which refers
to boys is that the programme has little or no impact on young children, since
they nearly all attend in the ¯rs place. However, it has a substantial impact on
the 14-17 age group. To go beyond this result to questions relating to the de-
sign of the programme we need a model. or alternatively a much more elaborate
experiment.
8Post-program di®erences in educational attendance










Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the locality level. Source: Attanasio et al (2005)
Table 2: Experimental Results October 1998
2.2 The model and its estimation
We consider the choice of attending school versus work for boys from age 11 to
16. The trade-o® is between current earnings in the labor market and future
increased earnings. These are set against other schooling costs, such as travel,
equipment etc. The choice takes place in an environment of idiosyncratic risk:
First, the child may not pass the grade and will have to repeat; second the costs
of schooling may change - we model this latter aspect as a shock to preferences.
The monetary opportunity cost of schooling is the local wage. We assume
that children have the possibility of attending school up to age 17. All formal
schooling ends by that time. In our model schooling is taken as an investment.
The parents are assumed to act in the best interest of the individual child and
hence do not trade-o® welfare between children.
When the grant is o®ered conditional on attending school it should have the
same e®ect as a reduction in schooling costs or alternatively a reduction in the
wage that the individual would earn if she worked. The implication is that it
9should be possible to estimate the e®ect of the grant on school participation
by learning about the sensitivity of individual schooling choices to wages. This
is the traditional approach to public policy analysis and dates back at least to
Marschak and Andrews (1944). For example, learning about the implication
of a tax rate on demand can be achieved by looking for a price increase under
similar conditions at some other historical moment or point in space. For the
PROGRESA case Todd and Wolpin (2003) use this idea to examine whether a
model estimated on non-experimental data and relying on wage variation can
predict the impact of the policy; the latter can be estimated in an unbiased way
because of the experimental design.
We take a di®erent tack in Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005). We
specify a dynamic model of education choice and include the grant as one of
the current bene¯ts of schooling. Subject to suitable scaling we can then test
whether the wage has the same e®ect (but in opposite direction) to the grant.
However, our model is more than just a testing vehicle. It provides a framework
to simulate changes in the design that would improve targeting and further
increase school participation, at the same overall cost.
The heart of the model is the schooling °ow utility function which we specify
to be a function of school availability in the village, distance from school and
direct costs of schooling. These variables either determine the cost of attending
school or are direct components of the cost, such as fees, shoes etc. In addition
we condition on parental education and ethnic background, to capture indirect
or \psychic" costs of schooling that may be driven by the support that the child
gets at home. Finally we condition on whether the household is programme
eligible in the sense of being below the poverty threshold de¯ned by the in-
10tervention, as well as living in an eligible village. These variables account for
permanent di®erences between eligible and ineligible households allowing for the
human capital di®erences that could occur because of di®erent income levels.
They also control for pre-programme di®erences that were identi¯ed among the
ineligible households. Going to school may build a habit and a taste for this, as
pupils learn to learn and create social networks. We thus include the past level
of attainment as an additional component in the °ow utility. Bene¯ciary house-
holds receive the grant, which is also included among the variables - its value
for boys varies by grade. The ¯nal component on the °ow utility of schooling
is a an unobserved component. This consists of a permanent e®ect and an iid
shock. The former re°ects unobserved tastes for schooling or factors such as
risk aversion that are not explicitly modelled here, since we do not include con-
sumption in a nonlinear way. The latter is an iid stochastic shock to schooling
costs that can be interpreted as transitory factors a®ecting attendance, such as
health for instance. Finally, when in work the °ow utility is proportional to the
wage he can earn.
The decision to attend school depends on comparing the expected discounted
°ows under the two alternatives, allowing for optimal decisions in the future. In
both cases we assume that beyond 17 the individual will be working and earning
wages commensurate to their educational attainment. Before that, individuals
either obtain the (possibly negative) utility cost of schooling when they attend
or earnings from the labor market, depending on their age and quali¯cation. In
simple within village regressions the returns to schooling are as low as 1% for a
year of education. However the relevant return is the one obtained when working
in the urban centres. This is of the order of 10%. In other words, individuals
11who obtain education are probably committing themselves to moving out to
seek better work opportunities.
To model schooling choice we need a forward looking dynamic model. The
model we consider is dynamic for three reasons. First, the fact that one cannot
attend regular school past age 17 means that going to school now provides the
option of completing some grades in the future. This source of dynamics be-
comes particularly important when we consider the impact of the PROGRESA
grants, because to take full advantage of the subsidy one has to attend continu-
ously and pass the grade. Second, we allow for state dependence: The number
of years of schooling a®ects the utility of attending in this period. State de-
pendence is important because it may be a mechanism that reinforces the e®ect
of the grant. Third education choices when young a®ect future earnings and
probably mobility choices.
The model contains two sources of uncertainty. We have already mentioned
the iid shock to the cost of schooling. This implies that the costs of schooling
are not known in future periods and consequently the individual has to take
into account that in future these may be higher or lower. The other source
of uncertainty originates from the that one may not pass a grade. This may
a®ect the value of attending. In our model we do not allow for an endogenous
supply of e®ort to a®ect the probability of passing. While this is a potentially
important source of programme impact we need to leave this for future work;
this will have to allow for the fact that the composition of those attending and
hence whose grade performance is observed are di®erent in the treatment and
control group.
Solving the model involves computing the value of the two alternatives -
12school and work, given the state variables, namely the current level of educa-
tion, and the wage and given the set of observed and unobserved characteristics
(at each point of the support of their distribution). This solution assumes fu-
ture optimal decisions and accounts for the impact of current choices on future
choices. Solving this model is straightforward because of the logistic assumption
on the iid school cost shock.
The randomized availability of the programme provides an important source
of exogenous variation for the identi¯cation of the structural economic model
and should increase our con¯dence in using it. While this is an important
source of variation is not su±cient to identify all key parameters.7 First, the
model includes the actual amount of the grant, a quantity that does not vary
randomly. Second the model also includes the wage for the child which re°ects
the opportunity cost of schooling.
To identify the impact of the grant we use the way it is designed to vary
with the grade. The lack of perfect correlation of grade and age generates the
required variation. Wages do vary from locality to locality and this variation is
used to identify the wage e®ect on schooling. This requires one to assume that
the variability is due to di®erent labor demand conditions, rather than changes
in labor supply induced by unobserved factors. In addition we use the adult
wage as an instrument for predicting wages. This controls for measurement
error and for missing wages caused by the choice to attend school.8
The experiment plays an important role in identifying the model. However,
it is also true that identi¯cation would bene¯t from a richer experimental ¯eld
7See Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005) for a full discussion of identi¯cation issues
8There is also an important initial conditions problem which causes an identi¯cation prob-
lem. This issue and its solution is discussed in Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005)
13trial. For example randomizing the amounts received across villages as well as
randomizing the age gradient of the grant would have been particularly useful.
In this sense thinking more broadly about the information that we would wish to
extract from an experiment, other than the simple quanti¯cation of a particular
design is very important when coming up with the design of an evaluation. It
is thus possible to come up both with a richer set of experimental results and
create the conditions for estimating economic theory based models with fewer
statistical and functional form assumptions, which tend to have no foundation
in economic theory.
The model we described can be estimated quite straightforwardly using max-
imum likelihood. The likelihood function is based on the distribution of " which
is assumed to be logistic. Unobserved heterogeneity is then integrated out using
a discrete mixture as in Heckman and Singer (1984).
2.3 Results and policy design
The estimated model ¯ts very well the experimental results, which is quite
remarkable for such a parsimonious speci¯cation. However, its value lies in its
ability to guide policy choices. In fact it provides a tool both for redesigning the
grant structure to obtain stronger attendance results and possibly to compare
the relative merits of such a conditional cash transfer to other infrastructure-
type policies; this would exploit the school availability variables and distance to
school, both of which are included.
A further potentially important contribution of such a is in its ability to
test whether the evaluation results of the experiment were similar to those that
would be predicted using observational data and relying on wage variation alone.
It turns out that the e®ect of the grant is three times higher than the wage, when
14this is scaled up to represent lost earnings from school attendance. Although
this points to the importance of running the experiment and collecting the
evaluation data base, one should not dismiss the underlying economic model on
the basis of this ¯nding: First wages may not be measured well enough leading
to an attenuating e®ect. Beyond this simple statistical explanation the e®ect
of the grant and of earnings may have di®erent e®ects because of who receives
each of them. Thus intrahousehold allocations may play an important role here,
implying that the source of income and to whom it is paid may have important
e®ects in itself. This point emphasizes the usefulness of the ¯eld trial; even
within the context of a structural model the information obtained from the trial
can be of critical importance in understanding how the policy works.
Using these estimates we can also address the question of redesigning the
programme. The grant is provided to all children over the age of 6. Our model
¯ts behavior from 10 onwards. The impact of the grant is very small at earlier
ages. In this policy experiment we consider redesigning the grant so as to make
it zero up to and including age 11 and redistribute the grant equally beyond
that date, keeping the overall cost of the programme the same. We show that
this simple redesign can almost double the e®ect of the policy on participation
at 15 and even more than double them at 16 - all this at no extra ¯nancial
cost (see Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005)). This simulation takes as
sole aim of the policy to get children into school. It may well be that the grant
before 12 was considered a pure transfer, conveniently handed out via the school,
since most children attend anyway. However, if school participation is the sole
intention, and because the programme has no e®ect on younger children, an
properly targeted unconditional transfer for this group may be more e±cient at
15alleviating poverty.
Our aim in this section has been to illustrate the power of combining ex-
perimental data with economic modelling. We illustrated how this can help
understand potential failings when using observational data and how the model
can enhance the use of the experiment in a policy context. We gave one ex-
ample, but with the possibility of comparing this policy to alternative options,
such as the use of infrastructure the scope of such an approach is very broad.
We now proceed to consider wider issues with General Equilibrium models.
3 Policy Interventions, Long Term Incentives and
General Equilibrium
The example we detailed in the previous section did not consider longer term
incentives of the programme and was set in a partial equilibrium context where
prices remain constant. In the longer run a number of changes can occur that
will alter the impact of the programme in important ways.
First, individuals may change their work and/or consumption behavior to
become eligible for the bene¯ts. This point is well understood in economics
and there is a vast literature on the work-disincentive e®ects of welfare bene¯ts.
These disincentives may not be important enough for one to want to avoid
implementing a programme. After all, the programme is in place partly to
alleviate a perceived market imperfection that prevents (in the PROGRESA
case) children from obtaining valuable education. However their magnitude
need to be measured if the programme is to be designed to achieve e®ectively
its aims.
Second, beyond these longer term incentive e®ects large scale programmes
16that successfully alter the supply of human capital may well a®ect prices. Thus
an increase in educated individuals may compress educational di®erentials, or an
increase in re-employment rates may put a downward pressure on wages. This
in itself may partly overturn the e®ects of the programme as estimated from
some limited ¯eld trial. This point has been eloquently made by Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1999); Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a) and Lee
(2001) have provided a quanti¯cation of the magnitude of the e®ects in quite
di®erent contexts. These papers show quite clearly that results can di®er quite
substantively, depending on the particular set up of the model and the choices
faced by individuals. They also illustrate the potential importance for policy of
allowing for such e®ects. In many cases the GE e®ects are lower than the partial
equilibrium ones. However this need not be the case. Thus, Gallipoli and Fella
(2005) show that the impact of an education subsidy on crime is reinforced in
General Equilibrium with substantially larger e®ects.
Considering the general equilibrium e®ects of a policy is necessarily much
more complicated because one has to take a stand on a number of important
issues, such as market structure for which the evidence may be scant. In GE
models the trade-o® between the richness of the model and its tractability can be
even more stark than usual. First, comes the problem of having available data
on all the required dimensions in a compatible way. Second, comes the issue of
de¯ning the way agents interact, which broadly speaking relates to de¯ning the
market structure as well as the role of the government in funding policy inter-
ventions. Thirdly comes the issue of potentially dealing with macroeconomic
shocks. Inevitably compromises have to be made.
We illustrate the issues involved in evaluating policy using two similar Gen-
17eral Equilibrium models chosen to ¯t US and UK data respectively. In both
cases individuals choose labor supply, consumption and education. They face
uncertainty on the returns to education. The models are of the overlapping
generations type and only steady state equilibria are considered. In other words
questions relating to transitional dynamics are not addressed. In the ¯rst case
the focus of the model is on analyzing human capital policies such as tuition sub-
sidies. The model and results are drawn from Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante
(2005) and we use this model to illustrate the potential issues of introducing
tuition subsidies. The main question is how e®ective can a policy be, funded by
proportional taxation of earnings, in encouraging College education and hence
increasing overall education levels and earnings.. In the second example we con-
sider a policy a®ecting individuals later in life, namely a wage subsidy available
to individuals at an age following the age when most people would have obtained
College education. The results we present are taken from Blundell, Costa-Dias,
and Meghir (2003) and illustrate not only the importance of allowing for price
changes but also the importance of dynamic incentive e®ects: individuals are
shown to change their early education choices in response to the future avail-
ability of the temporary subsidy. This illustrates, how a programme designed
to reduce unemployment can in the long run have opposite e®ects once dynamic
incentive and price changes combine. The motivation is to consider issues relat-
ing to the New Deal - an active labor market programme in the UK designed
to help the long term unemployed back to work. To economize in space we
base our description on the model developed by Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante
(2005); when required we highlight some key di®erences between the models..
183.1 The model
We consider a closed economy where a unique good is produced, and it can
be either consumed or used as physical capital. Our speci¯cation e®ectively
precludes factor price equalization and hence both the interest rate and human
capital prices are taken as endogenous to the economy. This is a contentious and
important issue that can a®ect policy in dramatic ways because when prices are
exogenous the GE e®ects we discuss will not take place. However the individual
dynamic incentives will still be altered by the policy.
We specify an overlapping generations general equilibrium model. Con-
sumers maximize an intertemporal utility function over their ¯nite life-cycle,
with respect to education, labor supply and consumption/savings. Agents can
accumulate assets representing ownership of shares on physical capital. They
have a maximum lifetime and they plan to consume their entire assets. However
they may die before that, leaving accidental bequests. The maximum possible
lifetime is 99 years. Individuals can work up to 65 but not beyond. They can
however decide not to work before that. Retirement is ¯nanced by the accu-
mulated assets. The population consists of 99 overlapping generations ex-ante
heterogeneous agents, each with an ex-ante identical distribution of heterogene-
ity.
Young and old households are not linked in any direct way. Bequests are
pooled together and redistributed to all newly born individuals according to
the steady state equilibrium wealth distribution. This re°ects both inter-vivo
transfers for education and actual bequests. We now provide a brief description
of the components of the model.
19The Individual problem Individuals can live up to a maximum age of 99,
but can die earlier with probability given by the US life tables. They maximize
an intertemporal utility function of consumption and leisure, additive over time
but nonadditive between consumption and leisure. They discount the future at
a personal discount factor ¯: Time can be used for education, work or leisure up
to age 22 and only for work or leisure after that age. the individual can choose
between education and work and leisure. When in education individuals have
to pay an annual fee; subsidizing this fee will be the policy instrument which we
will examine in this paper. Individuals di®er by an ability factor µ. This a®ects
the utility cost of education, by changing the time input required for obtaining
a particular quali¯cation (high school or College). This same factor also a®ects
the wage the individual can earn in the labor market. Individuals also choose
consumption in each period and can invest in a riskless asset at a rate r, which
is endogenous to the model. Assets have to be zero at the maximal age of 99.
However, individuals may die accidentally, leaving positive or negative assets.
As explained above these are redistributed to those entering the economy. The
individual faces uncertainty because of shocks to human capital that are not
insurable; these are described below.
The within period utility function is assumed to take the isoelastic weakly
separable form














The individual problem is solved recursively by backwards induction. This
results in education, consumption and labor supply choices all as a function of
unobserved heterogeneity, human capital prices, the interest rate and the state
20variables - which include the individual amount of human capital and wealth. as
well as consumption/savings decisions. In the model simulations we present here
we have set the intertemporal elasticity of consumption to 0.75 as in Blundell,
Browning, and Meghir (1994) and Attanasio and Weber (1993). Given this, a
value of º = 0:33 and hence ¸ = 2 leads to a solution that matches the labor
supply data very well.
3.2 The wage process
A key element of the model is the wage process because it drives both the
incentives to obtain education and the uncertainty faced by individuals. The
model we use is in e®ect the Roy model where the sector is identi¯ed with level of
education and is similar in nature to the model of Heckman and Sedlacec (1985).
The wage equations are stochastic and the shock to wages is the main source of
uncertainty in the model. For this we use the well established speci¯cation as
in MaCurdy (1981), Abowd and Card (1989) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
Thus, the empirical speci¯cation we estimate on the PSID data has the form
lnweit = wet + ge (ageeit) + ueit (1)
where wet represents the log of the aggregate price of human capital for edu-
cation group e and where ge (ageeit) is the education speci¯c pro¯le of wages.
The unobservable component ueit is speci¯ed to be
ueit = zeit + mit
zeit = zeit¡1 + "eit
zei0 = µi
(2)
where µi represents the e®ect of ability on initial wages. Consistent with the
literature zeit is the (persistent) component of unobserved human capital, which
21evolves as a random walk. The shock to wages "eit is drawn from a normal dis-
tribution with education speci¯c variance. Finally mit represents measurement
error, is assumed iid and does not a®ect behavior. Thus the model allows for one
more important channel for education choice, namely that of insurance. Since
individuals are risk averse, they will take into account the di®erent variance of
the shocks when making education decisions.
The wage process is estimated using the PSID. The variance of wage shocks
and of the measurement error are estimated using the variances and autoco-
variances of residual wage growth after taking out time and age e®ects based
on the PSID data. The approach followed is based on Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004). The main di±culty that needs to be addressed however, is estimating
the impact of ability on wages. This is important because it will allow education
choice to depend on labor market ability. To deal with this we use an IQ test
administered by the PSID in 1972. We thus regress wages on an age polynomial
and the IQ score, separately for each education group to obtain the e®ect of the
IQ test on wages. This is then used when solving the individual's problem.
3.3 Uncertainty or unobservability
An issue of central importance in such models is the real degree of uncertainty.
Measured wages vary; however there is no reason why this variability should rep-
resent uncertainty, because it may well be that the individual anticipates much
of this variability, or because it just re°ects measurement error. The model
described here strips out measurement error from uncertainty. It also ignores
any transitory shocks. Finally, uncertainty is taken to be the set of future inno-
vations to the permanent component of wages. There are two questions: First,
what is the extent to which such uncertainty, due to the wage process, is in-
22surable? Second, when does the \innovation" become known to the individual?
These are very hard issues to resolve; papers that have gone in that direction
are Blundell and Preston (1998), Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2005) and in
the context of education choices, Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2004). Identi-
fying what is in the information set and what is not at the time of a decision is
of course a very hard task which requires strong identifying restrictions. In the
present paper we assume that the variance of the permanent shocks to wages
re°ect uncertainty. This shock explains just a fraction of the observed condi-
tional cross sectional variance. This relates to the accumulation of past shocks,
already in the information set, as well as measurement error.
3.4 Production Structure
As far as the e®ectiveness of human capital policy is concerned the structure
of the production function is of central importance. In one extreme all types
of education can be perfect substitutes in the production function and the only
pertinent di®erence between individuals in this respect is amount of e±ciency
units of HC that they possess following their education and given their ability
µ. In this case, increasing the supply of say College graduates increases overall
human capital but does not a®ect the relative prices across types and hence
there are no GE e®ects. The other extreme is a Leontie® type technology where
GE e®ects will lead to full crowding out of any partial equilibrium e®ects since
the increase in one input has no impact on production unless the other inputs
increase by the right proportions. Thus reliable estimates of the production
technology are central to understanding the policy impact of an intervention.
We thus specify the production function to be









In principle one could allow di®erent elasticities of substitution between the
various skill groups. However, on US data we found these to be of very similar
magnitude and we could not reject they were in fact equal. In the UK paper on
wage subsidies we use a more general speci¯cation as described below. Details
on estimation are provided in Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2005) and draw
from Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a). The key issue is that we do not
observed human capital aggregates corresponding to the types of education in
the model. Thus we use the relative price series obtained from estimating the
wage equation on the PSID to compute e±ciency units of human capital for each
individual in the CPS, based on their observed earnings. We then aggregate
these quantities by education type and use NIPA data to ¯t the production
function using GMM.
The resulting elasticity of substitution based on an estimated ½ of 0.45 (se
0.13) is 1.82. Thus in the aggregate economy there seems to be quite a lot
of substitutability between the various types of human capital. This need not
re°ect the °exibility of technology within ¯rms but also the shift of production
between di®erent sectors relying on di®erent mixes of these inputs, as relative
factors change. The hypothesis of perfect substitutability however (½ = 1) is
clearly rejected and thus changes in the supply of the di®erent types of human
capital can lead to changes in their relative prices. However, we do accept the
hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution is the same across di®erent pairs
of human capital.
243.5 The e®ects of a tuition subsidy
Given the preference parameters, the estimated wage process and the production
function, the remaining parameters including the time costs of education f(µ)
are obtained by calibration. The baseline model is calibrated on the basis that
direct costs of College education are 30% of median annual income. The model
also includes a Government sector whose sole role is to raise proportional labor
taxes to fund any interventions. In other work we also consider the relative
merits of taxes on capital income.
When we solve the model we use the notion of a stationary recursive com-
petitive equilibrium Lucas (1980). In equilibrium all individual decisions are
optimal, input prices are set equal to the marginal product and the goods and
asset markets clear.
The model we have set up can address a number of topical policy issues,
including the impact of welfare bene¯ts, minimum wages, active labor market
programmes or of education policies. The key point of course is that such
interventions have e®ects on the decisions in the entire life-cycle, altering both
work incentives and incentives to accumulate human capital. The fact that
individuals are ex ante di®erent is a central characteristic of these models. It
allows for the existence of a group of individuals who justify the existence of the
programme as an attempt to compensate for low productivity and/or high costs
of schooling. It also allows an examination of how a policy a®ects inequality
driven be exogenous factors.
Here we illustrate some of the issues by considering a tuition subsidy for
College. This is an interesting policy to consider because it is high on the
agenda of many governments. In the UK for example there has been extensive
25The Impact of Tuition Subsidy
GROUPS Edu. Participation (aggr.shares) Human Capital Aggregates
Benchmark (30% of median income)
All Less than HS HS College Less than HS HS College
0.251 0.583 0.167 3.312 7.837 2.812
Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.955 1.0 1.413
Ability 2 0.576 0.394 0.03
Ability 3 0.305 0.595 0.10
Ability 4 (highest) 0.121 0.615 0.263 % with zero wealth 0.162
Partial Equilibrium results with a 50% tuition subsidy
Less than HS HS College Less than HS HS College
0.248 0.562 0.191 3.280 7.622 3.207
Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.948 1.0 1.294
Ability 2 0.576 0.379 0.045
Ability 3 0.303 0.577 0.120
Ability 4 (highest) 0.116 0.590 0.295 % with zero wealth 0.157
General Equilibrium results with a 50% tuition subsidy
Less than HS HS College Less than HS HS College
0.250 0.576 0.174 3.324 7.802 2.820
Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 1.0 0 0 0.954 1.0 1.396
Ability 2 0.568 0.389 0.042
Ability 3 0.307 0.580 0.113
Ability 4 (highest) 0.119 617 0.265 % with zero wealth 0.162
Elasticity of.Substitution=1.5. Source: Gallipoli et al. (2005)
Table 3: Tuition subsidy simulations with a CES Production function
26debate on how much the subsidy should be culminating with a reduction in
the tuition subsidy. In many other European countries no fees are charged and
all is paid for through general taxation. In the US there is an extensive loan
system as well as a number of scholarship programmes. The policy we consider
is a very simple one, namely a blanket reduction of College fees by 50% paid
for by general taxation. We will consider the e®ect of the subsidy on overall
numbers attending College, how this is distributed by ability groups, what is
the impact on between group inequality, and what is the e®ect on total human
capital supplied in each category.
The top panel of Table 3 shows the results for the benchmark economy. The
panel below shows what happens in partial equilibrium, when prices for human
capital do not change. However taxes must change to fund the tuition subsidy
and of course the underlying wealth distribution does change as well as the
work behavior. Thus even when the prices are taken as exogenous, this dynamic
model can give di®erent results from a simple pilot/control group comparison
because the need to fund the intervention internally will a®ect all individuals.
The lowest panel shows the general equilibrium results where human capital
prices and the interest rate are allowed to change.
In partial equilibrium this universal subsidy leads to an increase of college
graduates from 16.7% to 19.1%. Note that in this economy there are no liquidity
constraints and hence the tuition subsidy impact originates from the distortion
in education prices alone. There is also a counteracting e®ect from increased
taxation to fund the subsidy. The subsidy leads to large relative increases in
College attendance among the second and third ability groups, but not among
the lowest group who did not even complete high school before. It also in-
27creases College completion for the highest ability group. The total supply of
human capital increases by 14%. The key to what is going to happen next how-
ever, is the large decline in the marginal product of College graduates, which
declines from 1.413 to 1.294. If we now assume that prices are endogenous we
obtain the results in the lower part of the Table. On aggregate the increase in
the proportion of College graduates relative to the benchmark is less than 1%.
(17.4% College graduates). Interestingly though, the ones who drop out are pri-
marily the highest ability group. For them the decline in returns has the highest
impact; next largest drop comes from the second highest ability group. Ability
group 2 is hardly a®ected. Whether the policy is judged as e®ective or not
depends very much on the original objectives and on the social welfare function:
what has been achieved is an increase in College completion by lower ability
individuals, although the aggregate e®ects are small. In other simulations we
show that in the presence of liquidity constraints the policy impact is larger, and
has a stronger impact, as one would expect, on higher ability individuals who
wish to attend College because it o®ers funding they would otherwise not have.
However, here the absence of formal liquidity constraints replaces the funding
for College that would in many cases be o®ered by parents.
To take the policy analysis further one needs to link individuals to fami-
lies. One important source of College ¯nance comes from parents. Ability and
parental income are correlated, if anything because wealthier parents invest in
their children at an early age. Modelling this relationship and allowing for liq-
uidity constraints will allow better to consider the targeting of the policy and
analyze its e®ects in a possibly more realistic context. However these results,
obtained using parameters obtained from US data show that standard pilots
28only contain part of the story. They are more useful as a tool for estimating the
impact of incentives on individuals than on the ultimate design of policy. The
latter requires us to put together knowledge obtained from a variety of sources
and combined with theory and reasonable assumptions. The ¯nal outcomes can
be dramatically di®erent from those implied by a small scale pilot study. By
the way this conclusion is also true, at least to an extent, even when prices are
exogenous because of the impacts of changes in taxes and because of changes
in incentives not directly targeted by the policy, such as say work incentives or
incentives to train on the job, which have not been modelled here.
3.6 Wage subsidies education and employment
Using a model similar to the one described above Blundell, Costa-Dias, and
Meghir (2003) analyze the e®ect of a wage subsidy on employment and educa-
tion. There has been increased interest in such policies in a number of di®erent
countries. Examples include the British \New Deal" introduced in 1998 and the
Canadian the \Self Su±ciency Programme". The impacts of such programmes
have shown mixed results (see Card and Hyslop (2005) for Canada and Sianesi
(2003) for Sweden). The e®ectiveness of such policies in terms of increasing
wages and hence the longer term impact on employment remains an open ques-
tion. Certainly in the results we present with the empirical dynamic model,
where a time limited programme is used, the partial equilibrium results are
modest.
However we wish to bring out both the importance of longer term incentives
and the potential divergence between partial and general equilibrium policies.
Thus, the key point being emphasized here is that policies that are designed
to encourage employment may have substantially di®erent e®ects in the long
29run, as incentives for education choice and the attractiveness of unemployment
changes.
In the model used by Blundell, Costa-Dias, and Meghir (2003) a period is
¯ve years. However, the key di®erence from the model described in the section
above is that education choices can be made throughout the life-cycle, rather
than just at the start. Moreover work experience leads to the accumulation
of human capital. Thus while an individual is working her/his human capital
increases at a rate which depends on individual ability. This feature is important
in this model because it allows us to examine the basic premise of active labor
markets, namely that once individuals are placed in work their labor market
attachment will improve because their earnings increase. However, experience
is education type speci¯c and is lost once the individual decides to obtain more
education and change type. Heterogeneity in this model is of course crucial
because it allows to de¯ne a margin of individuals who are potential clients of a
programme and who could change their long term investments as a result of the
programme's existence. In this model labor supply is endogenous but does not
enter the utility function. It is determined as a function of a ¯xed cost of work.
The utility function is isoelastic in consumption. Hence uncertainty matters
and this originates in the stochastic process for wages. Thus the speci¯cation
described above has been designed to allow the programme to have an e®ect on
education choice and also to allow for the possibility that individuals substitute
between formal education and on-the-job-training o®ered by the programme,
when placed in work through a wage subsidy.
The production sector is a CES between the three types of Human Capital
and overall it is a Cobb-Douglas between HC and physical capital - much as
30in the model before with the di®erence that this model allows for a di®erent
level of substitutability between the three types of human capital. It was found
in fact that the elasticity of substitution between College graduates and High
school graduates was about 5. However between the less-than-high school group
and the aggregate of the other two the elasticity of substitution is 1.0. The
di®erent levels of substitutability will imply that GE e®ects for policies will
di®er depending on the skill group at which they are targeted.
With this model we consider two policies. One where those unemployed are
o®ered a wage subsidy of 25% the minimum wage and one of 50%. The wage
subsidy is only o®ered to the young, which in this model relates to the ¯rst period
of ¯ve years. We then examine the impact of the policy on those registered in
the programme in the ¯rst year for the subsequent part of the life-cycle. In the
baseline individuals have the choice to work, study or remain unemployed in
each and every period. They must also choose their consumption/savings level.
The policy is introduced by adding a new option in the ¯rst ¯ve-year period of
life. Under this option the individual may choose to remain unemployed and
then will obtain the subsidized wage as described above. Although our graph
depicts both policies we only discuss the stronger one which has some discernible
long term impact.
The partial equilibrium results reported in ¯gures 1 and 2 are not compa-
rable to the results one would obtain from a small scale short -run pilot study
because it allows individuals to change their work and education decisions (as
well as consumption) early on in the life-cycle. The results reported relate to
the impact of the programme for those who register. The programme makes a
spell of early unemployment more attractive and education less attractive, par-
31ticularly for individuals on the margins of ability enough for them to work or
continue with High School in the baseline economy. Such e®ects are potentially
very important but cannot normally be picked up from a standard ¯eld trial. An
intermediate approach is to run trials to learn about behavior and incorporate






































GE effect: policy 1
PE effect: policy 1
GE effect: policy 2
PE effect: policy 2
The impact ofthe wage subsidyonthe unemployment rate
Figure 1: The impact of wage subsidies on life-cycle employment (Source: Blun-
dell et al., 2005)
As seen in the ¯gures, the partial equilibrium e®ect of the policy, i.e. where
human capital prices are kept constant is to reduce unemployment by 1.5 per-
centage points. The e®ect is due to the increased labor market attachment
induced by the improvement in productivity, obtained as a result of the pro-
gramme. Five year later the e®ect declines to half the size. At the same time
¯gure 2 demonstrates that education rates decline, with an increase in the pro-





































GE effect: policy 1
PE effect: policy 1
GE effect: policy 2
PE effect: policy 2
Effect ofthe wage subsidyontheducationrate for those enrollinginthe programme
Figure 2: The Impact of the wage subsidies on education rates (Source: Blundell
et al., 2003)
33portion of those with less-than-high school of 6 percentage points. In General
equilibrium the e®ect of the policy is actually reversed. The reason for this at
¯rst sight surprising result is precisely the fact that the composition and size
of the unemployment pool changes as a result of the policy, initially drawing in
individuals who would otherwise not be unemployed. This reduces the price of
unskilled labor to such an extent that the policy now ends up increasing long-
run unemployment, because of the number of people with low ability who prefer
to go for the subsidy in period 1 of working life.
In terms of education the GE e®ect mitigates the adverse impact of the
programme. Some individuals ¯nd it bene¯cial to invest in formal education
once the programme period has ended and when they observe the decline in
unskilled wages. However, there are still more unskilled workers now relative to
the benchmark economy.
The key point to take away from this is that the longer term incentives
structure introduced by an intervention designed to reduce unemployment may
in fact achieve the opposite and may discourage the accumulation of human
capital ultimately defeating the original aim of the programme. What our model
shows is that with parameters obtained from data these concerns can be of
practical relevance. More research needs to be carried out to establish the
reliability of such models and the sensitivity of human capital prices to changes
in domestic supply. Placed in an international context, factor prices may be
equalized, in which case some of the e®ects we have documented will not be
relevant. However, even with exogenous prices of human capital, the issue of
dynamic incentives is likely to be important, with policies implemented over the
long run having very di®erent impacts from the short run returns.
344 Conclusions
Evaluation has progressed with leaps and bounds in the recent years. The
progress has built upon the important advances in our understanding of meth-
ods as well by the increasing demands for high quality evaluation by the govern-
ments and international organizations. In some sense increasing emphasis has
been given to non-parametric, \model free" methods and in particular to ran-
domized experiments. These have been very valuable in establishing the success
or otherwise of speci¯c programmes, but by their nature they are quite limited
in their ability to allow for redesign of programmes or for evaluating major in-
terventions, that are likely to a®ect prices, thus violating a key assumption in
the evaluation literature, namely that the control group is not a®ected.
In this paper we have explored two themes. In the ¯rst we consider a simple
structural model that is estimated based on data from a randomized experiment
but is then used to address issues of how the programme could be redesigned.
The estimated model is richer than one that would be estimated by traditional
observational data and one could argue that its identi¯cation rests on ¯rmer
ground than is often the case with such models. However, it uses assumptions
from economic theory, that may or may not appeal to some; with this combi-
nation of data and assumptions one obtains a tool that can go far beyond the
abilities of the simple ¯eld trail.
In the second theme we explore the use of General Equilibrium models for
policy evaluation with heterogeneous agents. In many ways this is quite a new
¯eld which requires exploration. Almost inevitably, these models require crucial
modelling choices and often heroic assumptions to be made. It is also often the
case that the model structure one wishes to impose leads to speci¯cations that
35are either very di±cult to estimate in a rigorous way or for which suitable data
is not available, requiring short cuts to be made in the way that parameters are
chosen or estimated. Despite all the di±culties however, the results themselves
justify the need to explore further and develop these models: GE outcomes can
be very di®erent from PE ones both overall and in detail. Thus small pilot
studies are frequently incapable of providing even a remotely accurate picture
of how a policy will operate when rolled out nationally. One may be justi¯ed in
being deeply sceptical in certain circumstances about results from GE models;
however these models illustrate that one should also be deeply skeptical about
concluding from the results of small scale pilot studies on the e®ects of major
policy interventions that alter long run incentives and that could a®ect prices.
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